Modern text classification models are susceptible to adversarial examples, perturbed versions of the original text indiscernible by humans but which get misclassified by the model. We present BAE, a powerful black box attack for generating grammatically correct and semantically coherent adversarial examples. BAE replaces and inserts tokens in the original text by masking a portion of the text and leveraging a language model to generate alternatives for the masked tokens. Compared to prior work, we show that BAE performs a stronger attack on three widely used models for seven text classification datasets.
Introduction
Recent studies have shown the vulnerability of ML models to adversarial attacks, small perturbations which lead to misclassification of inputs. Adversarial example generation in NLP (Zhang et al., 2019) is more challenging than in common computer vision tasks (Szegedy et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2017) due to two main reasons: the discrete nature of input space and ensuring semantic coherence with the original sentence. A major bottleneck in applying gradient based (Goodfellow et al., 2015) or generator model (Zhao et al., 2018) based approaches to generate adversarial examples in NLP is the backward propagation of the perturbations from the continuous embedding space to the discrete token space.
Recent works for attacking text models rely on introducing errors at the character level in words (Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018) or adding and deleting words (Li et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2018) , etc. for creating adversarial examples. These techniques often result in adversarial examples which are unnatural * Equal contributions by both authors Figure 1 : We use BERT-MLM to predict masked tokens in a given text for generating adversarial examples. The MASK token replaces a given word (BAE-R attack) or is inserted to the left/right of the word (BAE-I attack). Actual predictions made by the BERT-MLM are shown (they fit well into the sentence context) looking and lack grammatical correctness, and thus can be easily identified by humans.
TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019 ) is a black-box attack, that uses rule based synonym replacement from a fixed word embedding space to generate adversarial examples. These adversarial examples do not account for the overall semantics of the sentence, and consider only the token level similarity using word embeddings. This can lead to out-of-context and unnaturally complex replacements (see Table 3 ), which can be easily identifiable by humans.
The recent advent of powerful language models (Devlin et al., 2018; Radford et al., 2019) in NLP has paved the way for using them in various downstream applications. In this paper, we present a simple yet novel technique: BAE (BERT-based Adversarial Examples), which uses a language model (LM) for token replacement to best fit the overall context. We perturb an input sentence by either replacing a token or inserting a new token in the sentence, by means of masking a part of the input and using a LM to fill in the mask (See Figure 1) . BAE relies on the powerful BERT masked LM for ensuring grammatical correctness of the adversarial examples. Our attack beats the previous baselines by a large margin and confirms the inherent vulnerabilities of modern text classification models to adversarial attacks. Moreover, BAE produces more richer and natural looking adversarial examples as it uses the semantics learned by a LM.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use a LM for adversarial example generation. We summarize our major contributions as follows:
• We propose BAE, a novel strategy for generating natural looking adversarial examples using a masked language model. • We introduce 4 BAE attack modes, all of which are almost always stronger than previous baselines on 7 text classification datasets. • We show that, surprisingly, just a few replace/insert operations can reduce the accuracy of even a powerful BERT-based classifier by over 80% on some datasets.
Methodology
Problem Definition We are given a dataset (S, Y ) = {(S 1 , y 1 ), (S 2 , y 2 ) . . . (S m , y m )} and a trained classification model C : S → Y . We assume the soft-label black-box setting where the attacker can only query the classifier for output probabilities on a given input, and does not have access to the model parameters, gradients or training data. For an input pair (S, y), we want to generate an adversarial example S adv such that C(S adv ) =y where S adv is natural looking, grammatically correct and semantically similar to S (by some pre-defined definition of similarity).
BAE For generating adversarial example S adv , we define two perturbations on the input S:
• Replace a token t ∈ S with another • Insert a new token t in S Some tokens in the input are more attended to by C than others, and therefore contribute more towards the final prediction. Replacing these tokens or inserting a new token adjacent to them can thus have a stronger effect on altering the classifier prediction. We estimate the token importance I i of each token t i ∈ S = [t 1 , . . . , t n ], by deleting t i from S and computing the decrease in probability of predicting the correct label y, similar to (Jin et al., 2019) . While the motivation for replacing tokens in decreasing order of importance is clear, we conjecture that adjacent insertions in this same order can lead to a powerful attack. This intuition stems from the fact that the inserted token changes the local context around the original token.
The Replace (R) and Insert (I) operations are performed on a token t by masking it and inserting a mask token adjacent to it in S respectively. The pre-trained BERT masked language model (MLM) is used to predict the mask tokens (See Figure 1) .
BERT is a powerful LM trained on a large training corpus (∼ 2 billion words), and hence the predicted mask tokens fit well grammatically in S. The BERT-MLM does not however guarantee semantic coherence to the original text S as demonstrated by the following simple example. Consider the sentence: 'the food was good'. For replacing the token 'good', BERT-MLM may predict the tokens 'nice' and 'bad', both of which fit well into the context of the sentence. However, replacing 'good' with 'bad' changes the original sentiment of the sentence.
To ensure semantic similarity on introducing perturbations in the input text, we filter the set of top K masked tokens (K is a pre-defined constant) predicted by BERT-MLM using a Universal Sentence Encoder (USE) (Cer et al., 2018) based sentence similarity scorer. For the R operations we add an additional check for grammatical correctness of the generated adversarial example by filtering out predicted tokens that do not form the same part of speech (POS) as the original token t i in the sentence.
To choose the token for a perturbation (R/I) that best attacks the model from the filtered set of predicted tokens:
• If there are multiple tokens can cause C to misclassify S when they replace the mask, we choose the token which makes S adv most similar to the original S based on the USE score. • If no token causes misclassification, we choose the perturbation that decreases the prediction probability P (C(S adv )=y) the most.
The perturbations are applied iteratively to the input tokens in decreasing order of importance, until either C(S adv ) =y (successful attack) or all the tokens of S have been perturbed (failed attack). We present 4 attack modes for BAE based on the R and I operations, where for each token t in S:
• BAE-R: Replace token t (See Algorithm 1) • BAE-I: Insert a token to the left or right of t • BAE-R/I: Either replace token t or insert a token to the left or right of t • BAE-R+I: First replace token t, then insert a token to the left or right of t (Pang and Lee, 2005) contains movie reviews based on sentiment polarity. MPQA (Wiebe and Wilson, 2005 ) is a dataset for opinion polarity detection, Subj (Pang and Lee, 2004) for classifying a sentence as subjective or objective and TREC (Li and Roth, 2002) is a dataset for question type classification. We use 3 popular text classification models: word-LSTM (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) , word-CNN (Kim, 2014 ) and a fine-tuned BERT (Devlin et al., 2018) base-uncased classifier. For each dataset we train the model on the training data and perform the adversarial attack on the test data. For complete model details refer to Appendix.
As a baseline, we consider TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019) which performs synonym replacement using a fixed word embedding space (Mrkšić et al., 2016) . We only consider the top K=50 synonyms from the MLM predictions and set a threshold of 0.8 for the cosine similarity between USE based embeddings of the adversarial and input text. 
Results
We perform the 4 modes of our attack and summarize the results in Table 1 . Across datasets and models, our BAE attacks are almost always more effective than the baseline attack, achieving significant drops of 40-80% in test accuracies, with higher average semantic similarities as shown in parentheses. BAE-R+I is the strongest attack since it allows both replacement and insertion at the same token position, with just one exception. We observe a general trend that the BAE-R and BAE-I attacks often perform comparably, while the BAE-R/I and BAE-R+I attacks are much stronger. We observe that the BERT-based classifier is more robust to the BAE and TextFooler attacks than the word-LSTM and word-CNN models which can be attributed to its large size and pre-training on a large corpus.
The baseline attack is often stronger than the BAE-R and BAE-I attacks for the BERT based classifier. We attribute this to the shared parameter space between the BERT-MLM and the BERT classifier before fine-tuning. The predicted tokens from BERT-MLM may not drastically change the internal representations learned by the BERT classifier, hindering their ability to adversarially affect the classifier prediction. Effectiveness We study the effectiveness of BAE on limiting the number of R/I operations permitted on the original text. We plot the attack performance as a function of maximum % perturbation (ratio of number of word replacements and insertions to the length of the original text) for the TREC dataset. From Figure 2 , we clearly observe that the BAE attacks are consistently stronger than TextFooler. The classifier models are relatively robust to perturbations up to 20%, while the effectiveness saturates at 40-50%. Surprisingly, a 50% perturbation for the TREC dataset translates to replacing or inserting just 3-4 words, due to the short text lengths. Qualitative Examples We present adversarial examples generated by the attacks on a sentence from the IMDB and Yelp datasets in Table 3 . BAE produces more natural looking examples than TextFooler as tokens predicted by the BERT-MLM fit well in the sentence context. TextFooler tends to replace words with complex synonyms, which can be easily detected. Moreover, BAE's additional degree of freedom to insert tokens allows for a successful attack with fewer perturbations. Human Evaluation We consider successful adversarial examples generated from the Amazon and 
BAE-R+I: This beautiful movie offers many pleasant delights and surprises .
Original [Positive Sentiment]: Our server was great and we had perfect service . TEXTFOOLER: Our server was tremendous and we assumed faultless services. BAE-R: Our server was decent and we had outstanding service. BAE-I: Our server was great enough and we had perfect service but. BAE-R/I: Our server was great enough and we needed perfect service but. BAE-R+I: Our server was decent company and we had adequate service. In this paper, we have presented a novel technique for generating adversarial examples (BAE) based on a language model. The results obtained on several text classification datasets demonstrate the strength and effectiveness of our attack.
• Amazon: A Amazon product reviews dataset with 'Positive' / 'Negative' reviews 1 .
• Yelp: A restaurant reviews dataset from Yelp with 'Positive' or 'Negative' reviews 3 .
• IMDB: A IMDB movie reviews dataset with 'Positive' or 'Negative' reviews 3 .
• MR: A movie reviews dataset based on subjective rating and sentiment polarity 2 .
• MPQA: An unbalanced dataset for polarity detection of opinions 3 .
• TREC: A dataset for classifying types of questions with 6 classes for questions about a person, location, numeric information, etc. 4 .
• SUBJ: A dataset for classifying a sentence as objective or subjective.
A.2 Training Details
On the sentence classification task, we target three models: word-based convolutional neural network (WordCNN), wordbased LSTM, and the state-ofthe-art BERT. We use 100 filters of sizes 3,4,5 for the WordCNN model. Similar to (Jin et al., 2019) we use a 1-layer bi-directional LSTM with 150 hidden units and a dropout of 0.3. For both models, we use the 300 dimensional pre-trained counter fitted word embeddings. We used the BERT base uncased model which has 12-layers, 12 attention heads and 768 hidden dimension size. 
A.3 Results

A.4 Human Evaluation
We consider the input examples for which the attack can successfully flip the label of classifier for the dataset. We shuffle the original text and the adversarial examples and give them to human annotators. We ask the human annotators to label each sentence on the following:
• Predicting the label on the sentence (positive or negative sentiment) for the dataset and task
• Grammatical correctness of the sentence on a Likert scale of 1-5 : 1) Very poor grammatical coherence 2) Poor grammatical coherence 3) Average grammatical coherence 4) Good grammatical coherence 5) Very good grammatical coherence (Natural looking sentence)
We average the scores from two independent human evaluators and present them in the 
